From fc5d81e69d15c65ca20d9e5b4e242690e3e9c27d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Akinobu Mita Date: Mon, 27 Nov 2006 15:16:48 +0900 Subject: selinux: fix dentry_open() error check The return value of dentry_open() shoud be checked by IS_ERR(). Cc: Stephen Smalley Cc: James Morris Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita Signed-off-by: James Morris --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'security/selinux/hooks.c') diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 8ab5679a37a3..28ee187ed224 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -1754,7 +1754,8 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct * files) get_file(devnull); } else { devnull = dentry_open(dget(selinux_null), mntget(selinuxfs_mount), O_RDWR); - if (!devnull) { + if (IS_ERR(devnull)) { + devnull = NULL; put_unused_fd(fd); fput(file); continue; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 6b877699c6f1efede4545bcecc367786a472eedb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Venkat Yekkirala Date: Wed, 8 Nov 2006 17:04:09 -0600 Subject: SELinux: Return correct context for SO_PEERSEC Fix SO_PEERSEC for tcp sockets to return the security context of the peer (as represented by the SA from the peer) as opposed to the SA used by the local/source socket. Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala Signed-off-by: James Morris --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'security/selinux/hooks.c') diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 28ee187ed224..5bbd599a4471 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -3535,8 +3535,10 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *op } else if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) { peer_sid = selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_stream(sock); - if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) - peer_sid = selinux_socket_getpeer_stream(sock->sk); + if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) { + ssec = sock->sk->sk_security; + peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid; + } if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) { err = -ENOPROTOOPT; goto out; @@ -3647,11 +3649,11 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, return 0; } - err = selinux_xfrm_decode_session(skb, &peersid, 0); - BUG_ON(err); + selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &peersid); if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) { req->secid = sksec->sid; + req->peer_secid = 0; return 0; } @@ -3660,6 +3662,7 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, return err; req->secid = newsid; + req->peer_secid = peersid; return 0; } @@ -3669,6 +3672,7 @@ static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk, struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security; newsksec->sid = req->secid; + newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid; /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet. So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which @@ -3677,6 +3681,14 @@ static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk, selinux_netlbl_sk_security_init(newsksec, req->rsk_ops->family); } +static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, + struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + + selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &sksec->peer_sid); +} + static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req, struct flowi *fl) { @@ -4739,6 +4751,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = { .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft, .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request, .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone, + .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established, .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow, #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM -- cgit v1.2.3 From 67f83cbf081a70426ff667e8d14f94e13ed3bdca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Venkat Yekkirala Date: Wed, 8 Nov 2006 17:04:26 -0600 Subject: SELinux: Fix SA selection semantics Fix the selection of an SA for an outgoing packet to be at the same context as the originating socket/flow. This eliminates the SELinux policy's ability to use/sendto SAs with contexts other than the socket's. With this patch applied, the SELinux policy will require one or more of the following for a socket to be able to communicate with/without SAs: 1. To enable a socket to communicate without using labeled-IPSec SAs: allow socket_t unlabeled_t:association { sendto recvfrom } 2. To enable a socket to communicate with labeled-IPSec SAs: allow socket_t self:association { sendto }; allow socket_t peer_sa_t:association { recvfrom }; Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala Signed-off-by: James Morris --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) (limited to 'security/selinux/hooks.c') diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 5bbd599a4471..956137baf3e7 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -2889,7 +2889,8 @@ static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, } /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */ -static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad) +static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb, + struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto) { int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL; struct iphdr _iph, *ih; @@ -2907,6 +2908,9 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr; ret = 0; + if (proto) + *proto = ih->protocol; + switch (ih->protocol) { case IPPROTO_TCP: { struct tcphdr _tcph, *th; @@ -2950,7 +2954,8 @@ out: #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */ -static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad) +static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, + struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto) { u8 nexthdr; int ret = -EINVAL, offset; @@ -2971,6 +2976,9 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad if (offset < 0) goto out; + if (proto) + *proto = nexthdr; + switch (nexthdr) { case IPPROTO_TCP: { struct tcphdr _tcph, *th; @@ -3007,13 +3015,13 @@ out: #endif /* IPV6 */ static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad, - char **addrp, int *len, int src) + char **addrp, int *len, int src, u8 *proto) { int ret = 0; switch (ad->u.net.family) { case PF_INET: - ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad); + ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto); if (ret || !addrp) break; *len = 4; @@ -3023,7 +3031,7 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad, #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) case PF_INET6: - ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad); + ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto); if (ret || !addrp) break; *len = 16; @@ -3494,7 +3502,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) ad.u.net.netif = skb->dev ? skb->dev->name : "[unknown]"; ad.u.net.family = family; - err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 1); + err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 1, NULL); if (err) goto out; @@ -3820,6 +3828,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum, struct avc_audit_data ad; struct net_device *dev = (struct net_device *)out; struct sk_security_struct *sksec; + u8 proto; sk = skb->sk; if (!sk) @@ -3831,7 +3840,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum, ad.u.net.netif = dev->name; ad.u.net.family = family; - err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 0); + err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 0, &proto); if (err) goto out; @@ -3845,7 +3854,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum, if (err) goto out; - err = selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad); + err = selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto); out: return err ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT; } @@ -4764,7 +4773,6 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = { .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete, .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup, .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match, - .xfrm_flow_state_match = selinux_xfrm_flow_state_match, .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session, #endif -- cgit v1.2.3 From 2ee92d46c6cabedd50edf6f273fa8cf84f707618 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: James Morris Date: Mon, 13 Nov 2006 16:09:01 -0800 Subject: [SELinux]: Add support for DCCP This patch implements SELinux kernel support for DCCP (http://linux-net.osdl.org/index.php/DCCP), which is similar in operation to TCP in terms of connected state between peers. The SELinux support for DCCP is thus modeled on existing handling of TCP. A new DCCP socket class is introduced, to allow protocol differentation. The permissions for this class inherit all of the socket permissions, as well as the current TCP permissions (node_bind, name_bind etc). IPv4 and IPv6 are supported, although labeled networking is not, at this stage. Patches for SELinux userspace are at: http://people.redhat.com/jmorris/selinux/dccp/user/ I've performed some basic testing, and it seems to be working as expected. Adding policy support is similar to TCP, the only real difference being that it's a different protocol. Acked-by: Stephen Smalley Signed-off-by: James Morris Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 58 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) (limited to 'security/selinux/hooks.c') diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 956137baf3e7..0cf98740ddc6 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include /* for Unix socket types */ #include /* for Unix socket types */ @@ -751,6 +752,8 @@ static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protoc return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET; else return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET; + case SOCK_DCCP: + return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET; default: return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET; } @@ -2944,6 +2947,22 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb, break; } + case IPPROTO_DCCP: { + struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh; + + if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET) + break; + + offset += ihlen; + dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph); + if (dh == NULL) + break; + + ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport; + ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport; + break; + } + default: break; } @@ -3004,6 +3023,18 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, break; } + case IPPROTO_DCCP: { + struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh; + + dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph); + if (dh == NULL) + break; + + ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport; + ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport; + break; + } + /* includes fragments */ default: break; @@ -3188,7 +3219,11 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET: node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND; break; - + + case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET: + node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND; + break; + default: node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND; break; @@ -3226,16 +3261,17 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, return err; /* - * If a TCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port. + * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port. */ isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; - if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) { + if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET || + isec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) { struct sock *sk = sock->sk; struct avc_audit_data ad; struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL; struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL; unsigned short snum; - u32 sid; + u32 sid, perm; if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) { addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address; @@ -3254,11 +3290,13 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, if (err) goto out; + perm = (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ? + TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT; + AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET); ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum); ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family; - err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, - TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT, &ad); + err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, perm, &ad); if (err) goto out; } @@ -3446,7 +3484,13 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV; recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG; break; - + + case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET: + netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_RECV; + node_perm = NODE__DCCP_RECV; + recv_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG; + break; + default: netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV; node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV; @@ -3777,7 +3821,13 @@ static int selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(struct sock *sk, struct net_device * node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND; send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG; break; - + + case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET: + netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_SEND; + node_perm = NODE__DCCP_SEND; + send_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG; + break; + default: netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND; node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 9f2ad66509b182b399a5b03de487f45bde623524 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Moore Date: Fri, 17 Nov 2006 17:38:53 -0500 Subject: NetLabel: SELinux cleanups This patch does a lot of cleanup in the SELinux NetLabel support code. A summary of the changes include: * Use RCU locking for the NetLabel state variable in the skk_security_struct instead of using the inode_security_struct mutex. * Remove unnecessary parameters in selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(). * Rename selinux_netlbl_sk_clone_security() to selinux_netlbl_sk_security_clone() to better fit the other NetLabel sk_security functions. * Improvements to selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() to help reduce the cost of the common case. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore Signed-off-by: James Morris --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'security/selinux/hooks.c') diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 0cf98740ddc6..975c0dfb5a11 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -3140,9 +3140,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, if (sock->sk) { sksec = sock->sk->sk_security; sksec->sid = isec->sid; - err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock, - family, - isec->sid); + err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock); } return err; @@ -3661,7 +3659,7 @@ static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk) newssec->sid = ssec->sid; newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid; - selinux_netlbl_sk_clone_security(ssec, newssec); + selinux_netlbl_sk_security_clone(ssec, newssec); } static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid) @@ -3730,7 +3728,9 @@ static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk, So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which time it will have been created and available. */ - selinux_netlbl_sk_security_init(newsksec, req->rsk_ops->family); + /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only + * thread with access to newsksec */ + selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec, req->rsk_ops->family); } static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, -- cgit v1.2.3 From 3de4bab5b9f8848a0c16a4b1ffe0452f0d670237 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Moore Date: Fri, 17 Nov 2006 17:38:54 -0500 Subject: SELinux: peer secid consolidation for external network labeling Now that labeled IPsec makes use of the peer_sid field in the sk_security_struct we can remove a lot of the special cases between labeled IPsec and NetLabel. In addition, create a new function, security_skb_extlbl_sid(), which we can use in several places to get the security context of the packet's external label which allows us to further simplify the code in a few places. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore Signed-off-by: James Morris --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 43 ++++++++++++------------------------------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-) (limited to 'security/selinux/hooks.c') diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 975c0dfb5a11..a29d78d3f44c 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -3574,27 +3574,16 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *op u32 scontext_len; struct sk_security_struct *ssec; struct inode_security_struct *isec; - u32 peer_sid = 0; + u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL; isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; - /* if UNIX_STREAM check peer_sid, if TCP check dst for labelled sa */ - if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET) { + if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET || + isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) { ssec = sock->sk->sk_security; peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid; } - else if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) { - peer_sid = selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_stream(sock); - if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) { - ssec = sock->sk->sk_security; - peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid; - } - if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) { - err = -ENOPROTOOPT; - goto out; - } - } - else { + if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) { err = -ENOPROTOOPT; goto out; } @@ -3626,13 +3615,12 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff * u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL; int err = 0; - if (sock && (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)) + if (sock && sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX) selinux_get_inode_sid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid); - else if (skb) { - peer_secid = selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_dgram(skb); - if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL) - peer_secid = selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram(skb); - } + else if (skb) + security_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, + SECINITSID_UNLABELED, + &peer_secid); if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL) err = -EINVAL; @@ -3693,17 +3681,10 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 newsid; u32 peersid; - newsid = selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(skb, sksec->sid); - if (newsid != SECSID_NULL) { - req->secid = newsid; - return 0; - } - - selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &peersid); - + security_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, &peersid); if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) { req->secid = sksec->sid; - req->peer_secid = 0; + req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL; return 0; } @@ -3738,7 +3719,7 @@ static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, { struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; - selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &sksec->peer_sid); + security_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, &sksec->peer_sid); } static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req, -- cgit v1.2.3