From 051dbb918c7fb7da8e64a2cd0d804ba73399709f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dmitry Kasatkin Date: Fri, 14 Oct 2011 15:25:16 +0300 Subject: crypto: digital signature verification support This patch implements RSA digital signature verification using GnuPG library. The format of the signature and the public key is defined by their respective headers. The signature header contains version information, algorithm, and keyid, which was used to generate the signature. The key header contains version and algorythim type. The payload of the signature and the key are multi-precision integers. The signing and key management utilities evm-utils provide functionality to generate signatures and load keys into the kernel keyring. When the key is added to the kernel keyring, the keyid defines the name of the key. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin Acked-by: Mimi Zohar --- lib/digsig.c | 284 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 284 insertions(+) create mode 100644 lib/digsig.c (limited to 'lib/digsig.c') diff --git a/lib/digsig.c b/lib/digsig.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..fd2402f67f89 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/digsig.c @@ -0,0 +1,284 @@ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2011 Nokia Corporation + * Copyright (C) 2011 Intel Corporation + * + * Author: + * Dmitry Kasatkin + * + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License. + * + * File: sign.c + * implements signature (RSA) verification + * pkcs decoding is based on LibTomCrypt code + */ + +#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +static struct crypto_shash *shash; + +static int pkcs_1_v1_5_decode_emsa(const unsigned char *msg, + unsigned long msglen, + unsigned long modulus_bitlen, + unsigned char *out, + unsigned long *outlen, + int *is_valid) +{ + unsigned long modulus_len, ps_len, i; + int result; + + /* default to invalid packet */ + *is_valid = 0; + + modulus_len = (modulus_bitlen >> 3) + (modulus_bitlen & 7 ? 1 : 0); + + /* test message size */ + if ((msglen > modulus_len) || (modulus_len < 11)) + return -EINVAL; + + /* separate encoded message */ + if ((msg[0] != 0x00) || (msg[1] != (unsigned char)1)) { + result = -EINVAL; + goto bail; + } + + for (i = 2; i < modulus_len - 1; i++) + if (msg[i] != 0xFF) + break; + + /* separator check */ + if (msg[i] != 0) { + /* There was no octet with hexadecimal value 0x00 + to separate ps from m. */ + result = -EINVAL; + goto bail; + } + + ps_len = i - 2; + + if (*outlen < (msglen - (2 + ps_len + 1))) { + *outlen = msglen - (2 + ps_len + 1); + result = -EOVERFLOW; + goto bail; + } + + *outlen = (msglen - (2 + ps_len + 1)); + memcpy(out, &msg[2 + ps_len + 1], *outlen); + + /* valid packet */ + *is_valid = 1; + result = 0; +bail: + return result; +} + +/* + * RSA Signature verification with public key + */ +static int digsig_verify_rsa(struct key *key, + const char *sig, int siglen, + const char *h, int hlen) +{ + int err = -EINVAL; + unsigned long len; + unsigned long mlen, mblen; + unsigned nret, l; + int valid, head, i; + unsigned char *out1 = NULL, *out2 = NULL; + MPI in = NULL, res = NULL, pkey[2]; + uint8_t *p, *datap, *endp; + struct user_key_payload *ukp; + struct pubkey_hdr *pkh; + + down_read(&key->sem); + ukp = key->payload.data; + pkh = (struct pubkey_hdr *)ukp->data; + + if (pkh->version != 1) + goto err1; + + if (pkh->algo != PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA) + goto err1; + + if (pkh->nmpi != 2) + goto err1; + + datap = pkh->mpi; + endp = datap + ukp->datalen; + + for (i = 0; i < pkh->nmpi; i++) { + unsigned int remaining = endp - datap; + pkey[i] = mpi_read_from_buffer(datap, &remaining); + datap += remaining; + } + + mblen = mpi_get_nbits(pkey[0]); + mlen = (mblen + 7)/8; + + err = -ENOMEM; + + out1 = kzalloc(mlen, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!out1) + goto err; + + out2 = kzalloc(mlen, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!out2) + goto err; + + nret = siglen; + in = mpi_read_from_buffer(sig, &nret); + if (!in) + goto err; + + res = mpi_alloc(mpi_get_nlimbs(in) * 2); + if (!res) + goto err; + + err = mpi_powm(res, in, pkey[1], pkey[0]); + if (err) + goto err; + + if (mpi_get_nlimbs(res) * BYTES_PER_MPI_LIMB > mlen) { + err = -EINVAL; + goto err; + } + + p = mpi_get_buffer(res, &l, NULL); + if (!p) { + err = -EINVAL; + goto err; + } + + len = mlen; + head = len - l; + memset(out1, 0, head); + memcpy(out1 + head, p, l); + + err = -EINVAL; + pkcs_1_v1_5_decode_emsa(out1, len, mblen, out2, &len, &valid); + + if (valid && len == hlen) + err = memcmp(out2, h, hlen); + +err: + mpi_free(in); + mpi_free(res); + kfree(out1); + kfree(out2); + mpi_free(pkey[0]); + mpi_free(pkey[1]); +err1: + up_read(&key->sem); + + return err; +} + +/** + * digsig_verify() - digital signature verification with public key + * @keyring: keyring to search key in + * @sig: digital signature + * @sigen: length of the signature + * @data: data + * @datalen: length of the data + * @return: 0 on success, -EINVAL otherwise + * + * Verifies data integrity against digital signature. + * Currently only RSA is supported. + * Normally hash of the content is used as a data for this function. + * + */ +int digsig_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig, int siglen, + const char *data, int datalen) +{ + int err = -ENOMEM; + struct signature_hdr *sh = (struct signature_hdr *)sig; + struct shash_desc *desc = NULL; + unsigned char hash[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; + struct key *key; + char name[20]; + + if (siglen < sizeof(*sh) + 2) + return -EINVAL; + + if (sh->algo != PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA) + return -ENOTSUPP; + + sprintf(name, "%llX", __be64_to_cpup((uint64_t *)sh->keyid)); + + if (keyring) { + /* search in specific keyring */ + key_ref_t kref; + kref = keyring_search(make_key_ref(keyring, 1UL), + &key_type_user, name); + if (IS_ERR(kref)) + key = ERR_PTR(PTR_ERR(kref)); + else + key = key_ref_to_ptr(kref); + } else { + key = request_key(&key_type_user, name, NULL); + } + if (IS_ERR(key)) { + pr_err("key not found, id: %s\n", name); + return PTR_ERR(key); + } + + desc = kzalloc(sizeof(*desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(shash), + GFP_KERNEL); + if (!desc) + goto err; + + desc->tfm = shash; + desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP; + + crypto_shash_init(desc); + crypto_shash_update(desc, data, datalen); + crypto_shash_update(desc, sig, sizeof(*sh)); + crypto_shash_final(desc, hash); + + kfree(desc); + + /* pass signature mpis address */ + err = digsig_verify_rsa(key, sig + sizeof(*sh), siglen - sizeof(*sh), + hash, sizeof(hash)); + +err: + key_put(key); + + return err ? -EINVAL : 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(digsig_verify); + +static int __init digsig_init(void) +{ + shash = crypto_alloc_shash("sha1", 0, 0); + if (IS_ERR(shash)) { + pr_err("shash allocation failed\n"); + return PTR_ERR(shash); + } + + return 0; + +} + +static void __exit digsig_cleanup(void) +{ + crypto_free_shash(shash); +} + +module_init(digsig_init); +module_exit(digsig_cleanup); + +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); -- cgit v1.2.3 From f58a08152ce4198a2a1da162b97ecf8264c24866 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dmitry Kasatkin Date: Thu, 26 Jan 2012 19:13:25 +0200 Subject: lib/digsig: additional sanity checks against badly formated key payload Added sanity checks for possible wrongly formatted key payload data: - minimum key payload size - zero modulus length - corrected upper key payload boundary. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin Reviewed-by: Tetsuo Handa Signed-off-by: James Morris --- lib/digsig.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'lib/digsig.c') diff --git a/lib/digsig.c b/lib/digsig.c index fd2402f67f89..5d840ac64fb1 100644 --- a/lib/digsig.c +++ b/lib/digsig.c @@ -105,6 +105,10 @@ static int digsig_verify_rsa(struct key *key, down_read(&key->sem); ukp = key->payload.data; + + if (ukp->datalen < sizeof(*pkh)) + goto err1; + pkh = (struct pubkey_hdr *)ukp->data; if (pkh->version != 1) @@ -117,7 +121,7 @@ static int digsig_verify_rsa(struct key *key, goto err1; datap = pkh->mpi; - endp = datap + ukp->datalen; + endp = ukp->data + ukp->datalen; for (i = 0; i < pkh->nmpi; i++) { unsigned int remaining = endp - datap; @@ -128,7 +132,8 @@ static int digsig_verify_rsa(struct key *key, mblen = mpi_get_nbits(pkey[0]); mlen = (mblen + 7)/8; - err = -ENOMEM; + if (mlen == 0) + goto err; out1 = kzalloc(mlen, GFP_KERNEL); if (!out1) -- cgit v1.2.3 From b35e286a640f31d619a637332972498b51f3fd90 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dmitry Kasatkin Date: Thu, 26 Jan 2012 19:13:26 +0200 Subject: lib/digsig: pkcs_1_v1_5_decode_emsa cleanup Removed useless 'is_valid' variable in pkcs_1_v1_5_decode_emsa(), which was inhereted from original code. Client now uses return value to check for an error. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin Reviewed-by: Tetsuo Handa Signed-off-by: James Morris --- lib/digsig.c | 35 ++++++++++------------------------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) (limited to 'lib/digsig.c') diff --git a/lib/digsig.c b/lib/digsig.c index 5d840ac64fb1..b67e82c024b3 100644 --- a/lib/digsig.c +++ b/lib/digsig.c @@ -34,14 +34,9 @@ static int pkcs_1_v1_5_decode_emsa(const unsigned char *msg, unsigned long msglen, unsigned long modulus_bitlen, unsigned char *out, - unsigned long *outlen, - int *is_valid) + unsigned long *outlen) { unsigned long modulus_len, ps_len, i; - int result; - - /* default to invalid packet */ - *is_valid = 0; modulus_len = (modulus_bitlen >> 3) + (modulus_bitlen & 7 ? 1 : 0); @@ -50,39 +45,30 @@ static int pkcs_1_v1_5_decode_emsa(const unsigned char *msg, return -EINVAL; /* separate encoded message */ - if ((msg[0] != 0x00) || (msg[1] != (unsigned char)1)) { - result = -EINVAL; - goto bail; - } + if ((msg[0] != 0x00) || (msg[1] != (unsigned char)1)) + return -EINVAL; for (i = 2; i < modulus_len - 1; i++) if (msg[i] != 0xFF) break; /* separator check */ - if (msg[i] != 0) { + if (msg[i] != 0) /* There was no octet with hexadecimal value 0x00 to separate ps from m. */ - result = -EINVAL; - goto bail; - } + return -EINVAL; ps_len = i - 2; if (*outlen < (msglen - (2 + ps_len + 1))) { *outlen = msglen - (2 + ps_len + 1); - result = -EOVERFLOW; - goto bail; + return -EOVERFLOW; } *outlen = (msglen - (2 + ps_len + 1)); memcpy(out, &msg[2 + ps_len + 1], *outlen); - /* valid packet */ - *is_valid = 1; - result = 0; -bail: - return result; + return 0; } /* @@ -96,7 +82,7 @@ static int digsig_verify_rsa(struct key *key, unsigned long len; unsigned long mlen, mblen; unsigned nret, l; - int valid, head, i; + int head, i; unsigned char *out1 = NULL, *out2 = NULL; MPI in = NULL, res = NULL, pkey[2]; uint8_t *p, *datap, *endp; @@ -172,10 +158,9 @@ static int digsig_verify_rsa(struct key *key, memset(out1, 0, head); memcpy(out1 + head, p, l); - err = -EINVAL; - pkcs_1_v1_5_decode_emsa(out1, len, mblen, out2, &len, &valid); + err = pkcs_1_v1_5_decode_emsa(out1, len, mblen, out2, &len); - if (valid && len == hlen) + if (!err && len == hlen) err = memcmp(out2, h, hlen); err: -- cgit v1.2.3 From 86f8bedc9e1a8ddb4f1d9ff1f0c1229cc0797d6d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dmitry Kasatkin Date: Thu, 26 Jan 2012 19:13:24 +0200 Subject: lib/digsig: checks for NULL return value mpi_read_from_buffer() return value must not be NULL. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin Reviewed-by: Tetsuo Handa Signed-off-by: James Morris --- lib/digsig.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'lib/digsig.c') diff --git a/lib/digsig.c b/lib/digsig.c index b67e82c024b3..286d558033e2 100644 --- a/lib/digsig.c +++ b/lib/digsig.c @@ -109,9 +109,13 @@ static int digsig_verify_rsa(struct key *key, datap = pkh->mpi; endp = ukp->data + ukp->datalen; + err = -ENOMEM; + for (i = 0; i < pkh->nmpi; i++) { unsigned int remaining = endp - datap; pkey[i] = mpi_read_from_buffer(datap, &remaining); + if (!pkey[i]) + goto err; datap += remaining; } @@ -168,8 +172,8 @@ err: mpi_free(res); kfree(out1); kfree(out2); - mpi_free(pkey[0]); - mpi_free(pkey[1]); + while (--i >= 0) + mpi_free(pkey[i]); err1: up_read(&key->sem); -- cgit v1.2.3