diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'net/sctp')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/sctp/auth.c | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/sctp/input.c | 13 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/sctp/output.c | 7 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/sctp/outqueue.c | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/sctp/socket.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/sctp/tsnmap.c | 2 |
7 files changed, 26 insertions, 13 deletions
diff --git a/net/sctp/auth.c b/net/sctp/auth.c index 52db5f60daa0..56935bbc1496 100644 --- a/net/sctp/auth.c +++ b/net/sctp/auth.c @@ -141,8 +141,8 @@ void sctp_auth_destroy_keys(struct list_head *keys) /* Compare two byte vectors as numbers. Return values * are: * 0 - vectors are equal - * < 0 - vector 1 is smaller then vector2 - * > 0 - vector 1 is greater then vector2 + * < 0 - vector 1 is smaller than vector2 + * > 0 - vector 1 is greater than vector2 * * Algorithm is: * This is performed by selecting the numerically smaller key vector... @@ -489,7 +489,7 @@ int sctp_auth_init_hmacs(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, gfp_t gfp) return 0; out_err: - /* Clean up any successfull allocations */ + /* Clean up any successful allocations */ sctp_auth_destroy_hmacs(ep->auth_hmacs); return -ENOMEM; } diff --git a/net/sctp/input.c b/net/sctp/input.c index bf612d954d41..2e4a8646dbc3 100644 --- a/net/sctp/input.c +++ b/net/sctp/input.c @@ -249,6 +249,19 @@ int sctp_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb) */ sctp_bh_lock_sock(sk); + if (sk != rcvr->sk) { + /* Our cached sk is different from the rcvr->sk. This is + * because migrate()/accept() may have moved the association + * to a new socket and released all the sockets. So now we + * are holding a lock on the old socket while the user may + * be doing something with the new socket. Switch our veiw + * of the current sk. + */ + sctp_bh_unlock_sock(sk); + sk = rcvr->sk; + sctp_bh_lock_sock(sk); + } + if (sock_owned_by_user(sk)) { SCTP_INC_STATS_BH(SCTP_MIB_IN_PKT_BACKLOG); sctp_add_backlog(sk, skb); diff --git a/net/sctp/output.c b/net/sctp/output.c index c3f417f7ec6e..73639355157e 100644 --- a/net/sctp/output.c +++ b/net/sctp/output.c @@ -324,14 +324,16 @@ append: switch (chunk->chunk_hdr->type) { case SCTP_CID_DATA: retval = sctp_packet_append_data(packet, chunk); + if (SCTP_XMIT_OK != retval) + goto finish; /* Disallow SACK bundling after DATA. */ packet->has_sack = 1; /* Disallow AUTH bundling after DATA */ packet->has_auth = 1; /* Let it be knows that packet has DATA in it */ packet->has_data = 1; - if (SCTP_XMIT_OK != retval) - goto finish; + /* timestamp the chunk for rtx purposes */ + chunk->sent_at = jiffies; break; case SCTP_CID_COOKIE_ECHO: packet->has_cookie_echo = 1; @@ -470,7 +472,6 @@ int sctp_packet_transmit(struct sctp_packet *packet) } else chunk->resent = 1; - chunk->sent_at = jiffies; has_data = 1; } diff --git a/net/sctp/outqueue.c b/net/sctp/outqueue.c index 247ebc95c1e5..bc411c896216 100644 --- a/net/sctp/outqueue.c +++ b/net/sctp/outqueue.c @@ -929,7 +929,6 @@ static int sctp_outq_flush(struct sctp_outq *q, int rtx_timeout) } /* Finally, transmit new packets. */ - start_timer = 0; while ((chunk = sctp_outq_dequeue_data(q)) != NULL) { /* RFC 2960 6.5 Every DATA chunk MUST carry a valid * stream identifier. @@ -1028,7 +1027,7 @@ static int sctp_outq_flush(struct sctp_outq *q, int rtx_timeout) list_add_tail(&chunk->transmitted_list, &transport->transmitted); - sctp_transport_reset_timers(transport, start_timer-1); + sctp_transport_reset_timers(transport, 0); q->empty = 0; diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c index 1c4e5d6c29c0..3a0cd075914f 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c @@ -4268,9 +4268,9 @@ nomem: /* * Handle a protocol violation when the chunk length is invalid. - * "Invalid" length is identified as smaller then the minimal length a + * "Invalid" length is identified as smaller than the minimal length a * given chunk can be. For example, a SACK chunk has invalid length - * if it's length is set to be smaller then the size of sctp_sack_chunk_t. + * if its length is set to be smaller than the size of sctp_sack_chunk_t. * * We inform the other end by sending an ABORT with a Protocol Violation * error code. @@ -4300,7 +4300,7 @@ static sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_violation_chunklen( /* * Handle a protocol violation when the parameter length is invalid. - * "Invalid" length is identified as smaller then the minimal length a + * "Invalid" length is identified as smaller than the minimal length a * given parameter can be. */ static sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_violation_paramlen( diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c index b14a8f33e42d..ff0a8f88de04 100644 --- a/net/sctp/socket.c +++ b/net/sctp/socket.c @@ -2717,7 +2717,7 @@ static int sctp_setsockopt_associnfo(struct sock *sk, char __user *optval, int o paths++; } - /* Only validate asocmaxrxt if we have more then + /* Only validate asocmaxrxt if we have more than * one path/transport. We do this because path * retransmissions are only counted when we have more * then one path. diff --git a/net/sctp/tsnmap.c b/net/sctp/tsnmap.c index 35c73e82553a..9bd64565021a 100644 --- a/net/sctp/tsnmap.c +++ b/net/sctp/tsnmap.c @@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ void sctp_tsnmap_skip(struct sctp_tsnmap *map, __u32 tsn) */ bitmap_zero(map->tsn_map, map->len); } else { - /* If the gap is smaller then the map size, + /* If the gap is smaller than the map size, * shift the map by 'gap' bits and update further. */ bitmap_shift_right(map->tsn_map, map->tsn_map, gap, map->len); |