summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/lib/mpi/mpiutil.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>2017-12-26 23:43:54 -0600
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2018-01-23 19:57:09 +0100
commit0d92cf7f29e6ea8565546c5685b34e633300d8e8 (patch)
treec170842f73fa96aad1233e26a61a5f0a216a22b6 /lib/mpi/mpiutil.c
parentddfaa7acd7a27355200457eb56767cf5fcafc1d0 (diff)
x86/cpu, x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on AMD processors
commit 694d99d40972f12e59a3696effee8a376b79d7c8 upstream. AMD processors are not subject to the types of attacks that the kernel page table isolation feature protects against. The AMD microarchitecture does not allow memory references, including speculative references, that access higher privileged data when running in a lesser privileged mode when that access would result in a page fault. Disable page table isolation by default on AMD processors by not setting the X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE feature, which controls whether X86_FEATURE_PTI is set. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171227054354.20369.94587.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net Cc: Nick Lowe <nick.lowe@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/mpi/mpiutil.c')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions