openssl: update 1.0.2d -> 1.0.2k

This is basically a back port of the following commits from the
openembedded-core master branch:

openssl: actually apply Use-SHA256-not-MD5-as-default-digest.patch
openssl: Fix symlink creation
openssl: Updgrade 1.0.2j -> 1.0.2k
openssl: Use linux-aarch64 target for aarch64
openssl-native: Compile with -fPIC
openssl: Security fix CVE-2016-7055
OpenSSL: CVE-2004-2761 replace MD5 hash algorithm
openssl: fix bashism in c_rehash shell script
openssl: rehash actual mozilla certificates inside rootfs
openssl: Upgrade 1.0.2i -> 1.0.2j
openssl.inc: avoid random ptest failures
openssl: update to 1.0.2i (CVE-2016-6304 and more)
openssl: fix do_configure error when cwd is not in @INC
openssl: fix add missing dependencies building for test directory
openssl: Security fix CVE-2016-2178
openssl: Security fix CVE-2016-2177
openssl: prevent warnings from openssl-c_rehash.sh
openssl: fix the dangling libcrypto.a symlink
openssl: Ensure SSL certificates are stored on sysconfdir
openssl: Add Shell-Script based c_rehash utility
openssl: Security fix via update to 1.0.2h
openssl.inc: minor packaging cleanup
openssl: don't move libcrypto to base_libdir
openssl: add a patch to fix parallel builds
openssl: Security fix Drown via 1.0.2g update
openssl.inc: drop obsolete mtx-1 and mtx-2 over-rides
openssl: Explicitly set EXTRA_OEMAKE as required
openssl: update 1.0.2e -> 1.0.2f ( CVE-2016-0701 CVE-2015-3197 )
openssl: Add musl configuration support
openssl: update to 1.0.2e
openssl: enable parallel make
openssl: fix ptest issues
openssl: use subdir= instead of moving files in do_configure_prepend()
openssl: sanity check that the bignum module is present
openssl: fix ptest failures

Note that this requires a complete image rebuild due to ABI breakage. If
that is not desired something along those lines would need to be
integrated as well:

http://cgit.openembedded.org/openembedded-core/commit?id=480db6be99f9a53d8657b31b846f0079ee1a124f

Signed-off-by: Marcel Ziswiler <marcel.ziswiler@toradex.com>

1 files changed, 68 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/debian1.0.2/block_diginotar.patch b/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/debian1.0.2/block_diginotar.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d81e22c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/debian1.0.2/block_diginotar.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+From: Raphael Geissert <geissert@debian.org>
+Description: make X509_verify_cert indicate that any certificate whose
+ name contains "DigiNotar" is revoked.
+Forwarded: not-needed
+Origin: vendor
+Last-Update: 2011-09-08
+Bug: http://bugs.debian.org/639744
+Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
+Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen N Henson <shenson@drh-consultancy.co.uk>
+
+This is not meant as final patch.  
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [debian]
+
+Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
+
+Index: openssl-1.0.2g/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssl-1.0.2g.orig/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
++++ openssl-1.0.2g/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+@@ -119,6 +119,7 @@ static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *c
+ static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+ static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+ static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
++static int check_ca_blacklist(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+ 
+ static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
+                          unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
+@@ -489,6 +490,9 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx
+     if (!ok)
+         goto err;
+ 
++	ok = check_ca_blacklist(ctx);
++	if(!ok) goto err;
++
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
+     /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
+     ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx);
+@@ -996,6 +1000,29 @@ static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX
+     return 1;
+ }
+ 
++static int check_ca_blacklist(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
++	{
++	X509 *x;
++	int i;
++	/* Check all certificates against the blacklist */
++	for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--)
++		{
++		x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
++		/* Mark DigiNotar certificates as revoked, no matter
++		 * where in the chain they are.
++		 */
++		if (x->name && strstr(x->name, "DigiNotar"))
++			{
++			ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
++			ctx->error_depth = i;
++			ctx->current_cert = x;
++			if (!ctx->verify_cb(0,ctx))
++				return 0;
++			}
++		}
++	return 1;
++	}
++
+ static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
+                       X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
+                       STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)