diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/bpf/verifier.c')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 42 |
1 files changed, 26 insertions, 16 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index ecf4332ff312..88a468cc0510 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -2189,7 +2189,12 @@ static int backtrack_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx, if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) { if (!(*reg_mask & dreg)) return 0; - if (opcode == BPF_MOV) { + if (opcode == BPF_END || opcode == BPF_NEG) { + /* sreg is reserved and unused + * dreg still need precision before this insn + */ + return 0; + } else if (opcode == BPF_MOV) { if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { /* dreg = sreg * dreg needs precision after this insn @@ -2839,7 +2844,7 @@ static int check_stack_write_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, * so it's aligned access and [off, off + size) are within stack limits */ if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks && - state->stack[spi].slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL && + is_spilled_reg(&state->stack[spi]) && size != BPF_REG_SIZE) { verbose(env, "attempt to corrupt spilled pointer on stack\n"); return -EACCES; @@ -2885,7 +2890,7 @@ static int check_stack_write_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, insn->imm != 0 && env->bpf_capable) { struct bpf_reg_state fake_reg = {}; - __mark_reg_known(&fake_reg, (u32)insn->imm); + __mark_reg_known(&fake_reg, insn->imm); fake_reg.type = SCALAR_VALUE; save_register_state(state, spi, &fake_reg, size); } else if (reg && is_spillable_regtype(reg->type)) { @@ -4300,10 +4305,7 @@ static int check_stack_access_within_bounds( if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { min_off = reg->var_off.value + off; - if (access_size > 0) - max_off = min_off + access_size - 1; - else - max_off = min_off; + max_off = min_off + access_size; } else { if (reg->smax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || reg->smin_value <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { @@ -4312,15 +4314,12 @@ static int check_stack_access_within_bounds( return -EACCES; } min_off = reg->smin_value + off; - if (access_size > 0) - max_off = reg->smax_value + off + access_size - 1; - else - max_off = min_off; + max_off = reg->smax_value + off + access_size; } err = check_stack_slot_within_bounds(min_off, state, type); - if (!err) - err = check_stack_slot_within_bounds(max_off, state, type); + if (!err && max_off > 0) + err = -EINVAL; /* out of stack access into non-negative offsets */ if (err) { if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { @@ -6239,6 +6238,13 @@ static int prepare_func_exit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *insn_idx) verbose(env, "R0 not a scalar value\n"); return -EACCES; } + + /* we are going to rely on register's precise value */ + err = mark_reg_read(env, r0, r0->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64); + err = err ?: mark_chain_precision(env, BPF_REG_0); + if (err) + return err; + if (!tnum_in(range, r0->var_off)) { verbose_invalid_scalar(env, r0, &range, "callback return", "R0"); return -EINVAL; @@ -7289,6 +7295,10 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, } switch (base_type(ptr_reg->type)) { + case PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS: + if (known) + break; + fallthrough; case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP: /* smin_val represents the known value */ if (known && smin_val == 0 && opcode == BPF_ADD) @@ -9570,7 +9580,7 @@ static int check_return_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) struct tnum enforce_attach_type_range = tnum_unknown; const struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; struct bpf_reg_state *reg; - struct tnum range = tnum_range(0, 1); + struct tnum range = tnum_range(0, 1), const_0 = tnum_const(0); enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog); int err; struct bpf_func_state *frame = env->cur_state->frame[0]; @@ -9608,8 +9618,8 @@ static int check_return_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) return -EINVAL; } - if (!tnum_in(tnum_const(0), reg->var_off)) { - verbose_invalid_scalar(env, reg, &range, "async callback", "R0"); + if (!tnum_in(const_0, reg->var_off)) { + verbose_invalid_scalar(env, reg, &const_0, "async callback", "R0"); return -EINVAL; } return 0; |