diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c')
-rw-r--r-- | fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c | 58 |
1 files changed, 41 insertions, 17 deletions
diff --git a/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c b/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c index 87457227812c..69b610ad3fdc 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c +++ b/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c @@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ assemble_neg_contexts(struct smb2_negotiate_req *req) build_encrypt_ctxt((struct smb2_encryption_neg_context *)pneg_ctxt); req->NegotiateContextOffset = cpu_to_le32(OFFSET_OF_NEG_CONTEXT); req->NegotiateContextCount = cpu_to_le16(2); - inc_rfc1001_len(req, 4 + sizeof(struct smb2_preauth_neg_context) + 2 + inc_rfc1001_len(req, 4 + sizeof(struct smb2_preauth_neg_context) + sizeof(struct smb2_encryption_neg_context)); /* calculate hash */ } #else @@ -531,15 +531,22 @@ int smb3_validate_negotiate(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon) /* * validation ioctl must be signed, so no point sending this if we - * can not sign it. We could eventually change this to selectively + * can not sign it (ie are not known user). Even if signing is not + * required (enabled but not negotiated), in those cases we selectively * sign just this, the first and only signed request on a connection. - * This is good enough for now since a user who wants better security - * would also enable signing on the mount. Having validation of - * negotiate info for signed connections helps reduce attack vectors + * Having validation of negotiate info helps reduce attack vectors. */ - if (tcon->ses->server->sign == false) + if (tcon->ses->session_flags & SMB2_SESSION_FLAG_IS_GUEST) return 0; /* validation requires signing */ + if (tcon->ses->user_name == NULL) { + cifs_dbg(FYI, "Can't validate negotiate: null user mount\n"); + return 0; /* validation requires signing */ + } + + if (tcon->ses->session_flags & SMB2_SESSION_FLAG_IS_NULL) + cifs_dbg(VFS, "Unexpected null user (anonymous) auth flag sent by server\n"); + vneg_inbuf.Capabilities = cpu_to_le32(tcon->ses->server->vals->req_capabilities); memcpy(vneg_inbuf.Guid, tcon->ses->server->client_guid, @@ -569,8 +576,12 @@ int smb3_validate_negotiate(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon) } if (rsplen != sizeof(struct validate_negotiate_info_rsp)) { - cifs_dbg(VFS, "invalid size of protocol negotiate response\n"); - return -EIO; + cifs_dbg(VFS, "invalid protocol negotiate response size: %d\n", + rsplen); + + /* relax check since Mac returns max bufsize allowed on ioctl */ + if (rsplen > CIFSMaxBufSize) + return -EIO; } /* check validate negotiate info response matches what we got earlier */ @@ -1006,6 +1017,8 @@ SMB2_sess_setup(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_ses *ses, while (sess_data->func) sess_data->func(sess_data); + if ((ses->session_flags & SMB2_SESSION_FLAG_IS_GUEST) && (ses->sign)) + cifs_dbg(VFS, "signing requested but authenticated as guest\n"); rc = sess_data->result; out: kfree(sess_data); @@ -1084,9 +1097,6 @@ SMB2_tcon(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_ses *ses, const char *tree, else return -EIO; - if (tcon && tcon->bad_network_name) - return -ENOENT; - if ((tcon && tcon->seal) && ((ses->server->capabilities & SMB2_GLOBAL_CAP_ENCRYPTION) == 0)) { cifs_dbg(VFS, "encryption requested but no server support"); @@ -1104,6 +1114,10 @@ SMB2_tcon(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_ses *ses, const char *tree, return -EINVAL; } + /* SMB2 TREE_CONNECT request must be called with TreeId == 0 */ + if (tcon) + tcon->tid = 0; + rc = small_smb2_init(SMB2_TREE_CONNECT, tcon, (void **) &req); if (rc) { kfree(unc_path); @@ -1184,8 +1198,6 @@ tcon_exit: tcon_error_exit: if (rsp->hdr.Status == STATUS_BAD_NETWORK_NAME) { cifs_dbg(VFS, "BAD_NETWORK_NAME: %s\n", tree); - if (tcon) - tcon->bad_network_name = true; } goto tcon_exit; } @@ -1671,8 +1683,12 @@ SMB2_ioctl(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon, u64 persistent_fid, * than one credit. Windows typically sets this smaller, but for some * ioctls it may be useful to allow server to send more. No point * limiting what the server can send as long as fits in one credit + * Unfortunately - we can not handle more than CIFS_MAX_MSG_SIZE + * (by default, note that it can be overridden to make max larger) + * in responses (except for read responses which can be bigger. + * We may want to bump this limit up */ - req->MaxOutputResponse = cpu_to_le32(0xFF00); /* < 64K uses 1 credit */ + req->MaxOutputResponse = cpu_to_le32(CIFSMaxBufSize); if (is_fsctl) req->Flags = cpu_to_le32(SMB2_0_IOCTL_IS_FSCTL); @@ -1983,6 +1999,9 @@ void smb2_reconnect_server(struct work_struct *work) struct cifs_tcon *tcon, *tcon2; struct list_head tmp_list; int tcon_exist = false; + int rc; + int resched = false; + /* Prevent simultaneous reconnects that can corrupt tcon->rlist list */ mutex_lock(&server->reconnect_mutex); @@ -2010,13 +2029,18 @@ void smb2_reconnect_server(struct work_struct *work) spin_unlock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock); list_for_each_entry_safe(tcon, tcon2, &tmp_list, rlist) { - if (!smb2_reconnect(SMB2_INTERNAL_CMD, tcon)) + rc = smb2_reconnect(SMB2_INTERNAL_CMD, tcon); + if (!rc) cifs_reopen_persistent_handles(tcon); + else + resched = true; list_del_init(&tcon->rlist); cifs_put_tcon(tcon); } cifs_dbg(FYI, "Reconnecting tcons finished\n"); + if (resched) + queue_delayed_work(cifsiod_wq, &server->reconnect, 2 * HZ); mutex_unlock(&server->reconnect_mutex); /* now we can safely release srv struct */ @@ -2915,8 +2939,8 @@ copy_fs_info_to_kstatfs(struct smb2_fs_full_size_info *pfs_inf, kst->f_bsize = le32_to_cpu(pfs_inf->BytesPerSector) * le32_to_cpu(pfs_inf->SectorsPerAllocationUnit); kst->f_blocks = le64_to_cpu(pfs_inf->TotalAllocationUnits); - kst->f_bfree = le64_to_cpu(pfs_inf->ActualAvailableAllocationUnits); - kst->f_bavail = le64_to_cpu(pfs_inf->CallerAvailableAllocationUnits); + kst->f_bfree = kst->f_bavail = + le64_to_cpu(pfs_inf->CallerAvailableAllocationUnits); return; } |