diff options
author | Marcel Ziswiler <marcel.ziswiler@toradex.com> | 2020-02-04 11:31:11 +0100 |
---|---|---|
committer | Marcel Ziswiler <marcel.ziswiler@toradex.com> | 2020-02-07 13:50:20 +0100 |
commit | 500f9a04cd76f504285ad99b15e390e20ab17e0c (patch) | |
tree | e1c5ff3a78e75f0847b47fbac63d279dd411e7e5 /security | |
parent | 0f549d8c4d5edd68a2a492afd48228458d3bca4a (diff) | |
parent | 6d0c334a400db31751c787c411e7187ab59a3f1d (diff) |
Merge tag 'v4.14.164' into 4.14-2.3.x-imx
This is the 4.14.164 stable release
Conflicts:
arch/arm/Kconfig.debug
arch/arm/boot/dts/imx7s.dtsi
arch/arm/mach-imx/cpuidle-imx6q.c
arch/arm/mach-imx/cpuidle-imx6sx.c
arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/tlb.c
drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg.c
drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c
drivers/dma/imx-sdma.c
drivers/gpio/gpio-vf610.c
drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/adv7511/adv7511_drv.c
drivers/input/keyboard/imx_keypad.c
drivers/input/keyboard/snvs_pwrkey.c
drivers/mmc/core/block.c
drivers/mmc/core/queue.h
drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-esdhc-imx.c
drivers/net/can/flexcan.c
drivers/net/can/rx-offload.c
drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fec_main.c
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/pci.c
drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/cfg80211.c
drivers/pci/dwc/pci-imx6.c
drivers/spi/spi-fsl-lpspi.c
drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c
include/net/tcp.h
sound/soc/fsl/Kconfig
sound/soc/fsl/fsl_esai.c
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r-- | security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c | 14 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/apparmor/domain.c | 5 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/apparmor/label.c | 12 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/device_cgroup.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/inode.c | 13 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c | 59 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 21 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/keys/internal.h | 13 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/keys/key.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/keys/keyctl.c | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/keys/keyring.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/keys/proc.c | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/keys/process_keys.c | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/keys/request_key.c | 73 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/keys/request_key_auth.c | 24 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/lsm_audit.c | 10 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 54 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/smack/smack_access.c | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 19 |
22 files changed, 207 insertions, 140 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c index 0e03377bb83e..c106988c1b25 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c +++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c @@ -126,17 +126,22 @@ static int aafs_show_path(struct seq_file *seq, struct dentry *dentry) return 0; } -static void aafs_evict_inode(struct inode *inode) +static void aafs_i_callback(struct rcu_head *head) { - truncate_inode_pages_final(&inode->i_data); - clear_inode(inode); + struct inode *inode = container_of(head, struct inode, i_rcu); if (S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) kfree(inode->i_link); + free_inode_nonrcu(inode); +} + +static void aafs_destroy_inode(struct inode *inode) +{ + call_rcu(&inode->i_rcu, aafs_i_callback); } static const struct super_operations aafs_super_ops = { .statfs = simple_statfs, - .evict_inode = aafs_evict_inode, + .destroy_inode = aafs_destroy_inode, .show_path = aafs_show_path, }; @@ -358,6 +363,7 @@ static void aafs_remove(struct dentry *dentry) simple_rmdir(dir, dentry); else simple_unlink(dir, dentry); + d_delete(dentry); dput(dentry); } inode_unlock(dir); diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c index dd754b7850a8..67bf8b7ee8a2 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/domain.c +++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c @@ -1260,7 +1260,10 @@ check: aa_get_label(&profile->label)); if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(new)) { info = "failed to build target label"; - error = PTR_ERR(new); + if (!new) + error = -ENOMEM; + else + error = PTR_ERR(new); new = NULL; perms.allow = 0; goto audit; diff --git a/security/apparmor/label.c b/security/apparmor/label.c index c5b99b954580..ea63710442ae 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/label.c +++ b/security/apparmor/label.c @@ -1463,11 +1463,13 @@ static inline bool use_label_hname(struct aa_ns *ns, struct aa_label *label, /* helper macro for snprint routines */ #define update_for_len(total, len, size, str) \ do { \ + size_t ulen = len; \ + \ AA_BUG(len < 0); \ - total += len; \ - len = min(len, size); \ - size -= len; \ - str += len; \ + total += ulen; \ + ulen = min(ulen, size); \ + size -= ulen; \ + str += ulen; \ } while (0) /** @@ -1602,7 +1604,7 @@ int aa_label_snxprint(char *str, size_t size, struct aa_ns *ns, struct aa_ns *prev_ns = NULL; struct label_it i; int count = 0, total = 0; - size_t len; + ssize_t len; AA_BUG(!str && size != 0); AA_BUG(!label); diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c index 4ede87c30f8b..2cef8d4404cc 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c @@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ static bool unpack_nameX(struct aa_ext *e, enum aa_code code, const char *name) char *tag = NULL; size_t size = unpack_u16_chunk(e, &tag); /* if a name is specified it must match. otherwise skip tag */ - if (name && (!size || strcmp(name, tag))) + if (name && (!size || tag[size-1] != '\0' || strcmp(name, tag))) goto fail; } else if (name) { /* if a name is specified and there is no name tag fail */ diff --git a/security/device_cgroup.c b/security/device_cgroup.c index 5ef7e5240563..ea014df89428 100644 --- a/security/device_cgroup.c +++ b/security/device_cgroup.c @@ -569,7 +569,7 @@ static int propagate_exception(struct dev_cgroup *devcg_root, devcg->behavior == DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW) { rc = dev_exception_add(devcg, ex); if (rc) - break; + return rc; } else { /* * in the other possible cases: diff --git a/security/inode.c b/security/inode.c index 8dd9ca8848e4..829f15672e01 100644 --- a/security/inode.c +++ b/security/inode.c @@ -26,17 +26,22 @@ static struct vfsmount *mount; static int mount_count; -static void securityfs_evict_inode(struct inode *inode) +static void securityfs_i_callback(struct rcu_head *head) { - truncate_inode_pages_final(&inode->i_data); - clear_inode(inode); + struct inode *inode = container_of(head, struct inode, i_rcu); if (S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) kfree(inode->i_link); + free_inode_nonrcu(inode); +} + +static void securityfs_destroy_inode(struct inode *inode) +{ + call_rcu(&inode->i_rcu, securityfs_i_callback); } static const struct super_operations securityfs_super_operations = { .statfs = simple_statfs, - .evict_inode = securityfs_evict_inode, + .destroy_inode = securityfs_destroy_inode, }; static int fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c index 5ce081938178..ac1cf1dffc62 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c @@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ static int ima_calc_file_hash_atfm(struct file *file, { loff_t i_size, offset; char *rbuf[2] = { NULL, }; - int rc, read = 0, rbuf_len, active = 0, ahash_rc = 0; + int rc, rbuf_len, active = 0, ahash_rc = 0; struct ahash_request *req; struct scatterlist sg[1]; struct crypto_wait wait; @@ -257,11 +257,6 @@ static int ima_calc_file_hash_atfm(struct file *file, &rbuf_size[1], 0); } - if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)) { - file->f_mode |= FMODE_READ; - read = 1; - } - for (offset = 0; offset < i_size; offset += rbuf_len) { if (!rbuf[1] && offset) { /* Not using two buffers, and it is not the first @@ -276,8 +271,11 @@ static int ima_calc_file_hash_atfm(struct file *file, rbuf_len = min_t(loff_t, i_size - offset, rbuf_size[active]); rc = integrity_kernel_read(file, offset, rbuf[active], rbuf_len); - if (rc != rbuf_len) + if (rc != rbuf_len) { + if (rc >= 0) + rc = -EINVAL; goto out3; + } if (rbuf[1] && offset) { /* Using two buffers, and it is not the first @@ -300,8 +298,6 @@ static int ima_calc_file_hash_atfm(struct file *file, /* wait for the last update request to complete */ rc = ahash_wait(ahash_rc, &wait); out3: - if (read) - file->f_mode &= ~FMODE_READ; ima_free_pages(rbuf[0], rbuf_size[0]); ima_free_pages(rbuf[1], rbuf_size[1]); out2: @@ -336,7 +332,7 @@ static int ima_calc_file_hash_tfm(struct file *file, { loff_t i_size, offset = 0; char *rbuf; - int rc, read = 0; + int rc; SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(shash, tfm); shash->tfm = tfm; @@ -357,11 +353,6 @@ static int ima_calc_file_hash_tfm(struct file *file, if (!rbuf) return -ENOMEM; - if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)) { - file->f_mode |= FMODE_READ; - read = 1; - } - while (offset < i_size) { int rbuf_len; @@ -378,8 +369,6 @@ static int ima_calc_file_hash_tfm(struct file *file, if (rc) break; } - if (read) - file->f_mode &= ~FMODE_READ; kfree(rbuf); out: if (!rc) @@ -420,6 +409,8 @@ int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash) { loff_t i_size; int rc; + struct file *f = file; + bool new_file_instance = false, modified_flags = false; /* * For consistency, fail file's opened with the O_DIRECT flag on @@ -431,15 +422,41 @@ int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash) return -EINVAL; } - i_size = i_size_read(file_inode(file)); + /* Open a new file instance in O_RDONLY if we cannot read */ + if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)) { + int flags = file->f_flags & ~(O_WRONLY | O_APPEND | + O_TRUNC | O_CREAT | O_NOCTTY | O_EXCL); + flags |= O_RDONLY; + f = dentry_open(&file->f_path, flags, file->f_cred); + if (IS_ERR(f)) { + /* + * Cannot open the file again, lets modify f_flags + * of original and continue + */ + pr_info_ratelimited("Unable to reopen file for reading.\n"); + f = file; + f->f_flags |= FMODE_READ; + modified_flags = true; + } else { + new_file_instance = true; + } + } + + i_size = i_size_read(file_inode(f)); if (ima_ahash_minsize && i_size >= ima_ahash_minsize) { - rc = ima_calc_file_ahash(file, hash); + rc = ima_calc_file_ahash(f, hash); if (!rc) - return 0; + goto out; } - return ima_calc_file_shash(file, hash); + rc = ima_calc_file_shash(f, hash); +out: + if (new_file_instance) + fput(f); + else if (modified_flags) + f->f_flags &= ~FMODE_READ; + return rc; } /* diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 8daf16e1d421..4c160bee67f7 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -964,10 +964,10 @@ enum { }; static const char *const mask_tokens[] = { - "MAY_EXEC", - "MAY_WRITE", - "MAY_READ", - "MAY_APPEND" + "^MAY_EXEC", + "^MAY_WRITE", + "^MAY_READ", + "^MAY_APPEND" }; #define __ima_hook_stringify(str) (#str), @@ -1027,6 +1027,7 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) struct ima_rule_entry *entry = v; int i; char tbuf[64] = {0,}; + int offset = 0; rcu_read_lock(); @@ -1046,15 +1047,17 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) if (entry->flags & IMA_FUNC) policy_func_show(m, entry->func); - if (entry->flags & IMA_MASK) { + if ((entry->flags & IMA_MASK) || (entry->flags & IMA_INMASK)) { + if (entry->flags & IMA_MASK) + offset = 1; if (entry->mask & MAY_EXEC) - seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_exec)); + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_exec) + offset); if (entry->mask & MAY_WRITE) - seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_write)); + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_write) + offset); if (entry->mask & MAY_READ) - seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_read)); + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_read) + offset); if (entry->mask & MAY_APPEND) - seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_append)); + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_append) + offset); seq_puts(m, " "); } diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h index 503adbae7b0d..e3a573840186 100644 --- a/security/keys/internal.h +++ b/security/keys/internal.h @@ -188,20 +188,9 @@ static inline int key_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref, unsigned perm) return key_task_permission(key_ref, current_cred(), perm); } -/* - * Authorisation record for request_key(). - */ -struct request_key_auth { - struct key *target_key; - struct key *dest_keyring; - const struct cred *cred; - void *callout_info; - size_t callout_len; - pid_t pid; -} __randomize_layout; - extern struct key_type key_type_request_key_auth; extern struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, + const char *op, const void *callout_info, size_t callout_len, struct key *dest_keyring); diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c index 83bf4b4afd49..87172f99f73e 100644 --- a/security/keys/key.c +++ b/security/keys/key.c @@ -265,8 +265,8 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc, spin_lock(&user->lock); if (!(flags & KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN)) { - if (user->qnkeys + 1 >= maxkeys || - user->qnbytes + quotalen >= maxbytes || + if (user->qnkeys + 1 > maxkeys || + user->qnbytes + quotalen > maxbytes || user->qnbytes + quotalen < user->qnbytes) goto no_quota; } diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c index 1ffe60bb2845..ca31af186abd 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyctl.c +++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ #include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/uio.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> +#include <keys/request_key_auth-type.h> #include "internal.h" #define KEY_MAX_DESC_SIZE 4096 diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c index 36f842ec87f0..359b9cba3d0d 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyring.c +++ b/security/keys/keyring.c @@ -661,9 +661,6 @@ static bool search_nested_keyrings(struct key *keyring, BUG_ON((ctx->flags & STATE_CHECKS) == 0 || (ctx->flags & STATE_CHECKS) == STATE_CHECKS); - if (ctx->index_key.description) - ctx->index_key.desc_len = strlen(ctx->index_key.description); - /* Check to see if this top-level keyring is what we are looking for * and whether it is valid or not. */ @@ -921,6 +918,7 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search(key_ref_t keyring, struct keyring_search_context ctx = { .index_key.type = type, .index_key.description = description, + .index_key.desc_len = strlen(description), .cred = current_cred(), .match_data.cmp = key_default_cmp, .match_data.raw_data = description, diff --git a/security/keys/proc.c b/security/keys/proc.c index 6d1fcbba1e09..0ee9a36e6815 100644 --- a/security/keys/proc.c +++ b/security/keys/proc.c @@ -188,8 +188,7 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) int rc; struct keyring_search_context ctx = { - .index_key.type = key->type, - .index_key.description = key->description, + .index_key = key->index_key, .cred = m->file->f_cred, .match_data.cmp = lookup_user_key_possessed, .match_data.raw_data = key, diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c index 740affd65ee9..5f2993ab2d50 100644 --- a/security/keys/process_keys.c +++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ #include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/user_namespace.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> +#include <keys/request_key_auth-type.h> #include "internal.h" /* Session keyring create vs join semaphore */ diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c index 7dc741382154..2ecd67221476 100644 --- a/security/keys/request_key.c +++ b/security/keys/request_key.c @@ -18,31 +18,30 @@ #include <linux/keyctl.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include "internal.h" +#include <keys/request_key_auth-type.h> #define key_negative_timeout 60 /* default timeout on a negative key's existence */ /** * complete_request_key - Complete the construction of a key. - * @cons: The key construction record. + * @auth_key: The authorisation key. * @error: The success or failute of the construction. * * Complete the attempt to construct a key. The key will be negated * if an error is indicated. The authorisation key will be revoked * unconditionally. */ -void complete_request_key(struct key_construction *cons, int error) +void complete_request_key(struct key *authkey, int error) { - kenter("{%d,%d},%d", cons->key->serial, cons->authkey->serial, error); + struct request_key_auth *rka = get_request_key_auth(authkey); + struct key *key = rka->target_key; + + kenter("%d{%d},%d", authkey->serial, key->serial, error); if (error < 0) - key_negate_and_link(cons->key, key_negative_timeout, NULL, - cons->authkey); + key_negate_and_link(key, key_negative_timeout, NULL, authkey); else - key_revoke(cons->authkey); - - key_put(cons->key); - key_put(cons->authkey); - kfree(cons); + key_revoke(authkey); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(complete_request_key); @@ -91,21 +90,19 @@ static int call_usermodehelper_keys(const char *path, char **argv, char **envp, * Request userspace finish the construction of a key * - execute "/sbin/request-key <op> <key> <uid> <gid> <keyring> <keyring> <keyring>" */ -static int call_sbin_request_key(struct key_construction *cons, - const char *op, - void *aux) +static int call_sbin_request_key(struct key *authkey, void *aux) { static char const request_key[] = "/sbin/request-key"; + struct request_key_auth *rka = get_request_key_auth(authkey); const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); key_serial_t prkey, sskey; - struct key *key = cons->key, *authkey = cons->authkey, *keyring, - *session; + struct key *key = rka->target_key, *keyring, *session; char *argv[9], *envp[3], uid_str[12], gid_str[12]; char key_str[12], keyring_str[3][12]; char desc[20]; int ret, i; - kenter("{%d},{%d},%s", key->serial, authkey->serial, op); + kenter("{%d},{%d},%s", key->serial, authkey->serial, rka->op); ret = install_user_keyrings(); if (ret < 0) @@ -163,7 +160,7 @@ static int call_sbin_request_key(struct key_construction *cons, /* set up the argument list */ i = 0; argv[i++] = (char *)request_key; - argv[i++] = (char *) op; + argv[i++] = (char *)rka->op; argv[i++] = key_str; argv[i++] = uid_str; argv[i++] = gid_str; @@ -191,7 +188,7 @@ error_link: key_put(keyring); error_alloc: - complete_request_key(cons, ret); + complete_request_key(authkey, ret); kleave(" = %d", ret); return ret; } @@ -205,42 +202,31 @@ static int construct_key(struct key *key, const void *callout_info, size_t callout_len, void *aux, struct key *dest_keyring) { - struct key_construction *cons; request_key_actor_t actor; struct key *authkey; int ret; kenter("%d,%p,%zu,%p", key->serial, callout_info, callout_len, aux); - cons = kmalloc(sizeof(*cons), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!cons) - return -ENOMEM; - /* allocate an authorisation key */ - authkey = request_key_auth_new(key, callout_info, callout_len, + authkey = request_key_auth_new(key, "create", callout_info, callout_len, dest_keyring); - if (IS_ERR(authkey)) { - kfree(cons); - ret = PTR_ERR(authkey); - authkey = NULL; - } else { - cons->authkey = key_get(authkey); - cons->key = key_get(key); + if (IS_ERR(authkey)) + return PTR_ERR(authkey); - /* make the call */ - actor = call_sbin_request_key; - if (key->type->request_key) - actor = key->type->request_key; + /* Make the call */ + actor = call_sbin_request_key; + if (key->type->request_key) + actor = key->type->request_key; - ret = actor(cons, "create", aux); + ret = actor(authkey, aux); - /* check that the actor called complete_request_key() prior to - * returning an error */ - WARN_ON(ret < 0 && - !test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &authkey->flags)); - key_put(authkey); - } + /* check that the actor called complete_request_key() prior to + * returning an error */ + WARN_ON(ret < 0 && + !test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &authkey->flags)); + key_put(authkey); kleave(" = %d", ret); return ret; } @@ -275,7 +261,7 @@ static int construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring) if (cred->request_key_auth) { authkey = cred->request_key_auth; down_read(&authkey->sem); - rka = authkey->payload.data[0]; + rka = get_request_key_auth(authkey); if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &authkey->flags)) dest_keyring = @@ -545,6 +531,7 @@ struct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type, struct keyring_search_context ctx = { .index_key.type = type, .index_key.description = description, + .index_key.desc_len = strlen(description), .cred = current_cred(), .match_data.cmp = key_default_cmp, .match_data.raw_data = description, diff --git a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c index 424e1d90412e..1d34b2a5f485 100644 --- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c +++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> #include "internal.h" -#include <keys/user-type.h> +#include <keys/request_key_auth-type.h> static int request_key_auth_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *); static void request_key_auth_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *); @@ -69,7 +69,10 @@ static int request_key_auth_instantiate(struct key *key, static void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m) { - struct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data[0]; + struct request_key_auth *rka = get_request_key_auth(key); + + if (!rka) + return; seq_puts(m, "key:"); seq_puts(m, key->description); @@ -84,10 +87,13 @@ static void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *key, static long request_key_auth_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen) { - struct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data[0]; + struct request_key_auth *rka = get_request_key_auth(key); size_t datalen; long ret; + if (!rka) + return -EKEYREVOKED; + datalen = rka->callout_len; ret = datalen; @@ -110,7 +116,7 @@ static long request_key_auth_read(const struct key *key, */ static void request_key_auth_revoke(struct key *key) { - struct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data[0]; + struct request_key_auth *rka = get_request_key_auth(key); kenter("{%d}", key->serial); @@ -137,7 +143,7 @@ static void free_request_key_auth(struct request_key_auth *rka) */ static void request_key_auth_destroy(struct key *key) { - struct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data[0]; + struct request_key_auth *rka = get_request_key_auth(key); kenter("{%d}", key->serial); @@ -148,8 +154,9 @@ static void request_key_auth_destroy(struct key *key) * Create an authorisation token for /sbin/request-key or whoever to gain * access to the caller's security data. */ -struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const void *callout_info, - size_t callout_len, struct key *dest_keyring) +struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const char *op, + const void *callout_info, size_t callout_len, + struct key *dest_keyring) { struct request_key_auth *rka, *irka; const struct cred *cred = current->cred; @@ -167,6 +174,7 @@ struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const void *callout_info, if (!rka->callout_info) goto error_free_rka; rka->callout_len = callout_len; + strlcpy(rka->op, op, sizeof(rka->op)); /* see if the calling process is already servicing the key request of * another process */ @@ -246,7 +254,7 @@ struct key *key_get_instantiation_authkey(key_serial_t target_id) struct key *authkey; key_ref_t authkey_ref; - sprintf(description, "%x", target_id); + ctx.index_key.desc_len = sprintf(description, "%x", target_id); authkey_ref = search_process_keyrings(&ctx); diff --git a/security/lsm_audit.c b/security/lsm_audit.c index 67703dbe29ea..3a8916aa73c4 100644 --- a/security/lsm_audit.c +++ b/security/lsm_audit.c @@ -321,6 +321,7 @@ static void dump_common_audit_data(struct audit_buffer *ab, if (a->u.net->sk) { struct sock *sk = a->u.net->sk; struct unix_sock *u; + struct unix_address *addr; int len = 0; char *p = NULL; @@ -351,14 +352,15 @@ static void dump_common_audit_data(struct audit_buffer *ab, #endif case AF_UNIX: u = unix_sk(sk); + addr = smp_load_acquire(&u->addr); + if (!addr) + break; if (u->path.dentry) { audit_log_d_path(ab, " path=", &u->path); break; } - if (!u->addr) - break; - len = u->addr->len-sizeof(short); - p = &u->addr->name->sun_path[0]; + len = addr->len-sizeof(short); + p = &addr->name->sun_path[0]; audit_log_format(ab, " path="); if (*p) audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, p); diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index d6b9ed34ceae..5f7bfc65c446 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -471,16 +471,10 @@ static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid, return rc; } -static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb) +static int selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(struct super_block *sb) { - struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; - - return sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR || - sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS || - sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK || - sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE || - /* Special handling. Genfs but also in-core setxattr handler */ - !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") || + /* Special handling. Genfs but also in-core setxattr handler */ + return !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") || @@ -490,6 +484,34 @@ static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb) !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2"))); } +static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb) +{ + struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; + + /* + * IMPORTANT: Double-check logic in this function when adding a new + * SECURITY_FS_USE_* definition! + */ + BUILD_BUG_ON(SECURITY_FS_USE_MAX != 7); + + switch (sbsec->behavior) { + case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR: + case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS: + case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK: + case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE: + return 1; + + case SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS: + return selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(sb); + + /* Never allow relabeling on context mounts */ + case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT: + case SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE: + default: + return 0; + } +} + static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb) { struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; @@ -1000,8 +1022,11 @@ static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb, BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)); /* if fs is reusing a sb, make sure that the contexts match */ - if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) + if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) { + if ((kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context) + *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS; return selinux_cmp_sb_context(oldsb, newsb); + } mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock); @@ -3336,12 +3361,16 @@ static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) { struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode); + struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; u32 newsid; int rc; if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; + if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + if (!value || !size) return -EACCES; @@ -6100,7 +6129,10 @@ static void selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode) */ static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen) { - return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0); + int rc = selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, + ctx, ctxlen, 0); + /* Do not return error when suppressing label (SBLABEL_MNT not set). */ + return rc == -EOPNOTSUPP ? 0 : rc; } /* diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h index cc35695d97b4..45ef6a0c17cc 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ #include <linux/capability.h> +#include <linux/socket.h> #define COMMON_FILE_SOCK_PERMS "ioctl", "read", "write", "create", \ "getattr", "setattr", "lock", "relabelfrom", "relabelto", "append", "map" diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c index 524068d71bc1..9d9f6bb1e56e 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c @@ -275,6 +275,8 @@ static int rangetr_cmp(struct hashtab *h, const void *k1, const void *k2) return v; } +static int (*destroy_f[SYM_NUM]) (void *key, void *datum, void *datap); + /* * Initialize a policy database structure. */ @@ -322,8 +324,10 @@ static int policydb_init(struct policydb *p) out: hashtab_destroy(p->filename_trans); hashtab_destroy(p->range_tr); - for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++) + for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++) { + hashtab_map(p->symtab[i].table, destroy_f[i], NULL); hashtab_destroy(p->symtab[i].table); + } return rc; } diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c index 1a3004189447..a9c20821a726 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_access.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c @@ -469,7 +469,7 @@ char *smk_parse_smack(const char *string, int len) if (i == 0 || i >= SMK_LONGLABEL) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); - smack = kzalloc(i + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + smack = kzalloc(i + 1, GFP_NOFS); if (smack == NULL) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); @@ -504,7 +504,7 @@ int smk_netlbl_mls(int level, char *catset, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap, if ((m & *cp) == 0) continue; rc = netlbl_catmap_setbit(&sap->attr.mls.cat, - cat, GFP_KERNEL); + cat, GFP_NOFS); if (rc < 0) { netlbl_catmap_free(sap->attr.mls.cat); return rc; @@ -540,7 +540,7 @@ struct smack_known *smk_import_entry(const char *string, int len) if (skp != NULL) goto freeout; - skp = kzalloc(sizeof(*skp), GFP_KERNEL); + skp = kzalloc(sizeof(*skp), GFP_NOFS); if (skp == NULL) { skp = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); goto freeout; diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index c8fd5c10b7c6..a0e1b99212b2 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ static struct smack_known *smk_fetch(const char *name, struct inode *ip, if (!(ip->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP); - buffer = kzalloc(SMK_LONGLABEL, GFP_KERNEL); + buffer = kzalloc(SMK_LONGLABEL, GFP_NOFS); if (buffer == NULL) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); @@ -944,7 +944,8 @@ static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) if (rc != 0) return rc; - } else if (bprm->unsafe) + } + if (bprm->unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) return -EPERM; bsp->smk_task = isp->smk_task; @@ -4031,6 +4032,8 @@ access_check: skp = smack_ipv6host_label(&sadd); if (skp == NULL) skp = smack_net_ambient; + if (skb == NULL) + break; #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net); ad.a.u.net->family = family; @@ -4356,6 +4359,12 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, int request = 0; int rc; + /* + * Validate requested permissions + */ + if (perm & ~KEY_NEED_ALL) + return -EINVAL; + keyp = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); if (keyp == NULL) return -EINVAL; @@ -4375,10 +4384,10 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, ad.a.u.key_struct.key = keyp->serial; ad.a.u.key_struct.key_desc = keyp->description; #endif - if (perm & KEY_NEED_READ) - request = MAY_READ; + if (perm & (KEY_NEED_READ | KEY_NEED_SEARCH | KEY_NEED_VIEW)) + request |= MAY_READ; if (perm & (KEY_NEED_WRITE | KEY_NEED_LINK | KEY_NEED_SETATTR)) - request = MAY_WRITE; + request |= MAY_WRITE; rc = smk_access(tkp, keyp->security, request, &ad); rc = smk_bu_note("key access", tkp, keyp->security, request, rc); return rc; |