diff options
| author | Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com> | 2008-09-03 01:02:19 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de> | 2008-09-08 03:20:21 -0700 |
| commit | 113de4111795af1245a84368c233f25699999908 (patch) | |
| tree | bee30e2d21d97d2760455579394ce1c21a458ab5 | |
| parent | 1c6f8e1945a2b8317e5dad8fb5cfc882bd35b2b8 (diff) | |
sctp: correct bounds check in sctp_setsockopt_auth_key
[ Upstream commit 328fc47ea0bcc27d9afa69c3ad6e52431cadd76c ]
The bonds check to prevent buffer overlflow was not exactly
right. It still allowed overflow of up to 8 bytes which is
sizeof(struct sctp_authkey).
Since optlen is already checked against the size of that struct,
we are guaranteed not to cause interger overflow either.
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
| -rw-r--r-- | net/sctp/socket.c | 2 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c index d9373c358ab2..05185c772d25 100644 --- a/net/sctp/socket.c +++ b/net/sctp/socket.c @@ -3072,7 +3072,7 @@ static int sctp_setsockopt_auth_key(struct sock *sk, goto out; } - if (authkey->sca_keylength > optlen) { + if (authkey->sca_keylength > optlen - sizeof(struct sctp_authkey)) { ret = -EINVAL; goto out; } |